Introduction
Computerized trading of¯nancial instruments has made considerable head- Young and Theys, 1999) . Others dispute these arguments (Pirrong, 1996) . The empirical record is mixed, although recent evidence suggests that electronic markets can o®er as much or more liquidity than°oor-based markets (Pirrong, 1996 (Pirrong, , 2003c Moreover, traders in°oor-based and computerized markets may have di®er-ent information. These factors, in turn, imply that liquidity, and hence the cost of trading, can di®er across trading technologies.
More speci¯cally,°oor (\downstairs") traders can supply liquidity in an open outcry market, but \upstairs" traders can do so as well by submitting limit orders to the°oor.
1 Upstairs and downstairs traders have di®erent 1 To clarify, in this article I use the term \upstairs trader" to refer to traders not on an exchange°oor who supply liquidity on exchanges through limit orders. These are to be distinguished from upstairs traders who participate in o®-exchange trading, such as block positioners, third market dealers, and internalizers. Extensive empirical evidence (summarized in Pirrong, 2002 and 2003a) demonstrates that upstairs o®-exchange traders typically attempt to screen out the informed and restrict their counterparties to information sets, which a®ect their costs of supplying liquidity. Floor traders may have an information edge due to their \time and space" advantage over upstairs traders. Due to the time lags inherent in trading via limit order, upstairs traders face the risk of having their limit orders \picked o®" due to the arrival of information subsequent to order submission; the risk of being picked o® is lower for a°oor trader whose bid or o®er are good \only as long as his breath is warm." Furthermore,°oor traders and upstairs traders may have access to di®erent sources of information that a®ect the quality of their value signals, which in turn a®ect the risk and cost of supplying liquidity.
2
Electronic trading abolishes the time and space advantage of the°oor trader. All traders on an computerized market face identical risk of being picked o®. This reduces the cost upstairs traders incur to supply liquidity.
Ceteris paribus this makes the computerized market more liquid than its
open outcry counterpart. But ceteris may not be paribus. Floor traders have very specialized skills, and might not be able to supply liquidity as e±ciently through a computerized system as on the°oor. Moreover, if traders have access to better information on the°oor than upstairs (due to factors other than the time and space advantage),°oor traders incur higher costs to supply liquidity in a computerized system than they do on the°oor.
Based on these considerations, the model implies that the relative potenthe veri¯ably uninformed. Pirrong (2002 Pirrong ( , 2003a analyzes market structure with \cream skimming" of this sort.
2 Upstairs traders can give some discretion to°oor brokers as a means of reducing the costs of supplying liquidity via limit order. However, as noted by Grossman (1992) ,°oor brokers cannot fully redress the \free option" problem inherent in supplying liquidity via limit order.
tial liquidity of computerized and°oor markets depends primarily on three factors: (1) the relative sizes of the upstairs and downstairs liquidity pools, (2) the cost that upstairs traders incur in an open outcry environment due to their time and space disadvantage, and (3) the quality and quantity of information available to upstairs and downstairs traders. In turn, these factors depend on trading technology (in both the computerized and°oor systems) and information technology. Variations in these factors over time or across markets can therefore cause temporal and cross sectional variation in trading technology.
If there are no costs of coordination, the trading mechanism (computerized or open outcry) that o®ers the greatest potential liquidity attracts the entire order°ow; a system's potential liquidity is realized if all uninformed traders use that system. However,¯nancial trading exhibits network e®ects (Pirrong, 2002 (Pirrong, , 2003a . Due to these network e®ects, the liquidity of a market depends on how many investors and hedgers trade there. Hence, an ine±cient trading technology can survive if it is costly to coordinate the movement of investors and hedgers to the more e±cient system. When such coordination costs exist, the ine±cient trading mechanism can survive unless the trading cost di®erential implied by the potential liquidity di®erential exceeds the cost of coordinating a movement of investors and hedgers to system with the greater potential liquidity.
The existence of coordination costs implies that there is no guarantee that the most e±cient trading platform prevails. In this environment, exchange ownership and governance structures in°uence trading technology choice. Similarly, the structure of the brokerage industry and the integra-tion of trading and brokerage activities also in°uence the choice of trading platform. The number and relative size of brokerage¯rms that can make order routing decisions can in°uence coordination costs, and the integration of proprietary and agency trading in upstairs¯rms can in°uence the incentives of these¯rms to support computerized trading.
The remainder of this article is organzied as follows. Section 2 presents a formal model of liquidity in an open outcry market with both upstairs and downstairs traders. Section 3 presents a similar model of liquidity in a computerized market. Section 4 uses these models to identify the factors that determine the relative liquidity of computerized and open outcry exchanges.
Section 5 discusses how coordination costs and network e®ects inherent in liquidity imply that the most liquid trading technology will not necessarily be adopted. It shows further how exchange organization and governance, and the structure of the upstairs trading industry in°uence the choice of trading technology. Section 6 summarizes the article.
Liquidity in an Open Outcry Market
Consider a market for a¯nancial instrument. The true value of the instrument is v. Two types of agents desire to trade it. First, there is a large (but nite) number of noise traders. Net noise trader demand for the asset is (a) perfectly inelastic, and (b) a normal random variable with mean 0 and variance S. Individual noise trader demands are uncorrelated, so the variance of the sum of several noise trader's demands is equal to the sum of the variances of their individual demands. Noise trader demand and the value of the asset are orthogonal. There are also K risk neutral informed traders who know the true value of the asset v. The noise traders and informed traders trade via market order.
This section presents a model of a°oor-based, open outcry trading mechanism. This exchange is modeled as in Kyle (1985) . Speci¯cally, the¯nancial instrument is traded in a batch auction on the°oor of the exchange.
There are two types of traders who can supply liquidity to the market by absorbing any imbalances in market orders submitted to the°oor by the informed and noise traders. First, there are F N traders, F = fF 1 ; F 2 ; : : : ; F N g who can trade on the exchange°oor. The F N°o or traders can supply liquidity by shouting out bids and o®ers on the°oor of the exchange. Each such \°oor trader" F i is risk averse, with a constant absolute risk aversion coe±cient ® i . Equivalently, the risk tolerance of°oor trader F i is t i = 1=® i .
The total supply of risk bearing capacity (i.e., aggregate risk tolerance) of the°oor traders is T F = P F i 2F t i . At the time that they must submit their orders to the auction (where this time is denoted by X F ), each°oor trader's information implies that the expected value of the instrument is zero, and the variance of the instrument value is ¾ 2 .
The second group of liquidity suppliers consists of \upstairs" traders.
These traders cannot trade on the°oor, but can supply liquidity by submitting limit orders to the market. There are U M such traders, U = fU 1 ; U 2 ; : : : ; U M g.
Each upstairs trader U j is risk averse, with a constant absolute risk aversion coe±cient ¹ j . Equivalently, the risk tolerance of upstairs trader U j is ¿ j = 1=¹ j . The total supply of risk bearing capacity (i.e., aggregate risk tolerance) of the upstairs traders is
An upstairs trader has a di®erent information set than the°oor trader. Relatedely, Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) argue that°oor trading is informative because (1) it is not completely anonymous, and (2)°oor traders interact repeatedly. Due to these factors,°oor traders share information on the characteristics of order°ow and intrinsic value, thereby reducing information asymmetry and increasing liquidity. In contrast, such features are absent in computerized markets. Ceteris paribus this would tend to make them less liquid than open outcry exchanges. Conversely, Pirrong (1996) ar- 5 Cowan and Shumway argue that due to these \non-market signals," the°oor trading environment is informationally richer than a computerized environment (p. 20). This comparison is somewhat one-sided, however, as Cowan-Shumway do not investigate whether there are di®erent \non-market signals" available upstairs that are absent on the°oor; Grossman (1992) , for instance, suggests that upstairs traders may possess some information that°oor traders lack. It would be interesting to measure noise levels in upstairs trading rooms, for instance. It would also be interesting to see whether volumes of phone, email, or instant messenger tra±c involving upstairs traders are correlated with price volatility or lead it. As a result of this one-sidedness, Cowan and Shumway's interesting results do not prove that°oor traders have more information than upstairs traders, although they do suggest this possibility. Moreover, their description also focuses on liquidity-related information, rather than value-related information. It may be the case that even if better liquidity-related information is available on the°oor, better valuerelated information is available upstairs (due to, for instance, easier access to electronic information resources). Computer trading system developers are working to use visual and aural displays to communicate information about market activity of the type that is available on the°oor (Young and Theys, 1999) .
gues that repeated interaction and imperfect anonymity can also sustain collusion among°oor traders, which would tend to increase trading costs.
Owing to these considerations, at the time (X F ) that the°oor trader must submit his order, the upstairs trader's information implies a di®erent distribution for v than possessed by the°oor traders. Speci¯cally, each upstairs trader U j 2 U estimates that the mean of v is zero, and the variance of v is µ¾ 2 , where µ <=> 1. µ < 1 (µ > 1) if the upstairs trader's information is superior (inferior) at any point in time. If information about the instrument's true is revealed between the time that the upstairs trader must submit his order (where this time is denoted by X U < X F ) and the time that an downstairs trader must submit his, the up-stairs trader's time and space disadvantage forces him to condition his order on less information than the°oor trader. This makes the upstairs liquidity supplier more vulnerable to being \picked o®." Due to this consideration, at the time he must submit his order, the upstairs trader's information implies that the mean value of the instrument is zero, and the variance of this value is ¢µ¾ 2 , with ¢ > 1. That is, the delay in execution increases the risk that the upstairs trader incurs to supply liquidity. ¢ is larger, the greater the rate of information°ow between X U and X F and the greater the amount of time required to submit a limit order.
As in Brown-Zhang (1997), Glosten (1994) , and Hellwig (1980) I assume that both°oor traders and upstairs traders submit continuous demand schedules. That is, they indicate the quantity that they are willing to buy or sell at each possible price. As in Brown-Zhang and Glosten, I interpret these schedules as collections of limit orders at di®erent prices. With an in¯nites-simal tick size, the°oor and upstairs traders can submit continuous demand schedules.
The°oor auction takes place immediately after the°oor traders submit their bids and o®ers, i.e., at the auction takes place at X F +dt. This captures the fact that°oor traders' bids and o®ers are binding for a very short period of time.
Analysis of the equilibrium in this market proceeds in the usual way by conjecturing a linear equilibrium, and solving for the relevant parameters.
Speci¯cally, upon learning v the informed traders conjecture that the price on the exchange is a linear function of order°ow:
where w k is the order that the informed trader k submits, z is net noise trader demand, and¸F is a constant. Given this conjecture, the informed trader l chooses w l , i = 1; 2 to maximize:
where the expectation is taken over z. Given that v and z are orthogonal, the symmetric solution of the informed traders' maximization problems implies that:
Conditional on order°ow,°oor trader F i chooses his trade y i to maximize his risk-adjusted pro¯t:
F is the variance of v conditional on K¯F v + z and the°oor traders' other information, and where P is given by (1) . Note that due to the normality of v and z, E F [vjK¯F v + z] is given by the regression of v on K¯F v + z:
7 The subscript on the expectations operator indicates that this expectation is conditional on the information available to the°oor trader at the time he submits his order. Trading by limit order e®ectively permits conditioning orders on price. Since price is a linear function of order°ow, this is equivalent to conditioning trades on order°ow: This is true for upstairs traders as well.
The¯rst order conditions for a maximum imply:
Conditional on order°ow upstairs trader U j chooses his trade x j to maximize his risk-adjusted pro¯t:
U is the variance of v conditional on K¯F v + z and the information available to the upstairs trader, and where P is given by (1) . Note that due to the normality of v and z, E U [vjK¯F v + z] is:
Moreover, by (1),
and
De¯ne´= ¢µ. The¯rst order conditions for a maximum imply:
Market clearing implies:
Substituting the expressions for the y i and x j and simplifying implies:
Substituting from (6) for3 
The 1.¸F is decreasing in T F . Hence, the market is more liquid, the greater the risk bearing capacity of the°oor traders.
2.¸F is decreasing in T U . Hence, the market is more liquid, the greater the risk bearing capacity of the°oor traders.
3.¸F is increasing in´, and hence is increasing in ¢ and µ. This implies that the market is less liquid, the greater the time and space advantage of the°oor traders. Moreover, the market is less liquid, the less precise the information possessed by upstairs traders at any point in time.
All of these factors make supply of liquidity from upstairs traders less elastic.
4.¸F is decreasing in S, and becomes arbitrarily large as S approaches zero. This result is relevant in evaluating the e®ect of coordination costs.
It is also possible to show that the risk adjusted pro¯t earned by each°oor trader and each upstairs trader depends on these parameters. Of particular importance for the purposes of this analysis is the fact that the risk adjusted pro¯t earned by°oor traders is inversely related to T U and positively related to ¢ and µ. That is,°oor trading is more pro¯table, the lower the aggregate risk tolerance of the upstairs traders, the greater the°oor traders' time and space advantage, and the greater their information advantage at any point in time.
Liquidity in a Computerized Market
In a computerized market, all traders are upstairs traders; the traders in F must trade upstairs to supply liquidity in a computerized market. 8 This has two key implications. First, since upstairs traders in a computerized market can monitor conditions in real time and face no delay in submitting or withdrawing limit orders, computerization eliminates the time and space disadvantage of upstairs traders; now both upstairs and former°oor traders can submit their orders at time X F and the market clears at X F +dt. 9 Second, computerization eliminates the information disparities between°oor traders and upstairs traders.
These factors a®ect the variances that determine the risk of trading in the upstairs market. At the time they must submit their demand schedules of limit orders, those traders in F who could trade on the°oor in a°oor-based the upstairs traders' time-space disadvantage). If the¯rst alternative is the correct one (i.e.,°oor traders do worse upstairs because trading on screen lowers their t i rather than due to the elimination of information or to greater competition) the following analysis overstates the liquidity of the computerized market. This possibility can be incorporated into the analysis readily through the addition of another parameter, but the conclusion is intuitive. A decline in t i resulting from the move upstairs reduces the liquidity of the computerized market (relative to that derived here) and therefore favors the open outcry market ceteris paribus. It should also be noted that some°oor traders from LIFFE did make the transition; several computerized trading \arcades" catering to°oor traders opened after the closure of LIFFE's°oor (Young and Theys, 1999) . Moreover, most MATIF locals made the transition to electronic trading; indeed, the number of locals on MATIF rose after the commencement of electronic trading (Young and Theys, 1999) . 9 This presumes that the trading system has su±cient capacity and bandwidth. Some systems (notably Eurex in 1998 when its volume surged) have experienced capacity bottlenecks that have introduced time lags between order submission and execution (Young and Theys, 1999) . Such delays increase the risks and costs of supplying liquidity on a computerized system. The adverse e®ects of bottlenecks can be addressed formally by introducing a parameter ¢ C > 1 analogous to the ¢ parameter in the open outcry model. Miller (1991) argues that features inherent in computerized trading force all users to extend free options to the market. This could also create a ¢ C > 1. It should be noted, however, that designers of computerized systems have recognized this problem and have implemented shortcuts to allow users to revise and cancel orders at a keystroke. Such features sharply mitigate the free option problem. Moreover, it almost certainly true that ¢ C < ¢, i.e., upstairs traders get faster execution in a computerized market.
exchange estimate that the mean of the instrument is zero and its variance (before conditioning on price) is µ¾ 2 . Since the upstairs traders in U no longer face a time and space disadvantage when trading in a computerized market, their estimate of its variance (before conditioning on price) is also
An analysis similar to that performed above implies that:
where¸C is the depth of the computerized exchange,¯C = 1=(K +1)¸C gives the intensity of informed trading in the computerized market, and
is the variance of the instrument's value conditional on price and the information available at the time of order submission. Substituting¸C = 1=¯C(K+1) and from (16) into (15) implies a quadratic equation in¯C:
The positive root of this quadratic gives the equilibrium intensity of informed trading, and hence liquidity, on the computerized market.
A Comparison of the Liquidity of Computerized and Floor Exchanges
Since (a)¸F and¸C are each decreasing in the variance of noise trader order°o w, and (b) the variance of noise trader order°ow is proportional to the number of noise traders trading on an exchange, liquidity on an exchange is maximized (i.e., its¸is minimized) when all noise traders trade there. Thus, it is e±cient to concentrate noise trader activity on the exchange that o®ers the smallest¸evaluated when noise trader order°ow equals S. Therefore, to determine relative potential liquidity, it is appropriate to compare¸C anḑ F assuming all noise traders congregate at each type of exchange.
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Since (a) the positive root¯F increases as the left-hand-side of (14) rises, and (b) the positive root¯C increases as the left-hand-side of (17) rises,
is, the computerized market is more liquid than the open outcry exchange if
Rewriting this expression implies the computerized exchange is more liquid if and only if: 10 It is possible to show using an analysis similar to that in Pirrong (2002 Pirrong ( , 2003a ) that total cost, de¯ned as the sum of noise trader execution costs net of risk-adjusted liquidity supplier pro¯ts and informed trader pro¯ts, is decreasing in¸. Hence, it is e±cient to concentrate trading on the exchange with the lowest¸. or contingent claim. Cross-sectional comparisions (e.g., a comparision of the liquidity of a French stock traded on computer and a US stock traded on the°oor) would require controlling for variations in K, S, and ¾ 2 across instruments. This issue is discussed below.
Although superior information on the°oor is a necessary condition for
an open outcry exchange to be more liquid than a computerized one, it is not su±cient. In particular, the°oor's information advantage can be o®set by a su±ciently large T U :
Result 2 Given T F , µ, and ¢, there is a critical value of Relatedly:
Result 3 Given T U , µ, and ¢, there is a critical value of Result 4 Given µ, T F , and T U , there is a critical of ¢, ¢ ¤ = 1=(1+(1¡µ)
such that the computerized market is more liquid if ¢ > ¢ ¤ .
The greater the time-space tax, the greater the increase in liquidity supply that results from adoption of computerized trading.
The foregoing implies that changes that a®ect upstairs and°oor risk bearing capacities, information disparities, and the time-space tax a®ect the relative liquidity of°oor-based and computerized markets. This analysis permits an appraisal of the e®ect of several recent (and some not-so-recent)
innovations on the relative liquidity of°oor-based and computerized markets. Moreover, Young and Theys (1999) suggest some enhancements to computerized systems that would generate information that mimics the kinds of \soft" information available on the°oor. 12 Speci¯cally, they advocate enhanced visual (e.g., color graphics) and aural displays that communicate information 12 Some early electronic system designs actually attempted to do this. The NYSE-IBM Joint Study of automation of the°oor process (completed in 1968) revealed the identity of the participants in the computerized auction for any stock. Similarly, LIFFE's APT and the CBOT's Aurora (which was never used for actual trading) revealed the identities of bidders and o®erors. However, liquidity can di®er across trading venues even if one controls for di®erences in the characteristics of securities that may be related to the number of informed traders, noise trading activity, and uncertainty. In particular, risk bearing capacity may vary across markets. If it does, the model implies that liquidity will vary across markets as well even once di®erences related to variables such as K, S, and ¾ 2 are controlled for as done by Venkataraman and others. Existing cross-sectional studies do not control for possible differences in risk bearing capacities across markets, and hence cannot be used to determine whether changing trading technology in a given market (e.g., a switch to electronic trading on the NYSE) would cause liquidity to rise or fall in that market. Thus, although one may be tempted to interpret lower trading costs in a°oor market in a cross-sectional study as indicating that the°oor is \special" in some way{as would be the case if µ > 1, for instance{ such an interpretation is highly problematic if inter-market di®erences in risk bearing capacity are not controlled for.
It is not immediately obvious how one could control for di®erences in risk bearing capacity across markets. Specialist capital on the NYSE would be one measure of the capacity of a subset of liquidity suppliers in the US stock market, but since specialists make markets in several stocks there are obvious di±culties in using this data. Moreover, some°oor brokers on the dominates the membership (as is the case at most U.S. derivatives and equity exchanges), the protective umbrella provided by coordination costs and liquidity and pro¯tability. The move to computerized trading actually reduces upstairs traders' pro¯ts under certain parameter values. Although upstairs traders' share of trading activity is larger with computerized trading, the concommitant decline in their variance estimates exerts downward pressure on their risk-adjusted pro¯ts because competition between upstairs traders becomes more intense when ¢ falls. If T U is large relative to T F this increased competition between upstairs traders can result in lower pro¯ts in a computerized market. This can occur even if the computerized market is more liquid{ indeed, it occurs in part because the computerized market is more liquid. Thus, upstairs traders may not support computerization even if it is more e±cient. In the presence of coordination costs, in such circumstances upstairs and downstairs traders may agree to perpetuate°oor trading even if this is ine±cient. Whatever the exact e®ect, the general point holds; trading technology changes have distributive e®ects. 17 It is a stylized fact that individuals who trade on the°oor dominate the governance of US exchanges, but that corporations (notably banks and brokerage¯rms) exert far more in°uence in non-US exchanges than their US counterparts (Young and Theyss, 1999) . The pattern of trading technology adoption{with computerized trading making far more headway outside the United States than within it{is consistent with the hypothesis that the interests of dominant membership coalitions in°uence technology choice. It should also be noted, however, that the large population of skilled°oor traders on US exchanges (relative to their European counterparts) implies a large T F , which would lead to the same result. 18 Of course, there may be a con°ict between the interests of the integrated¯rm and its customers. The trading desks of these¯rms could prefer adoption of an electronic system even when the computerized market is less liquid (and thereby imposes higher trading costs on the¯rms' customers). Agency costs between the brokerage¯rms and their customers could lead the¯rms to support electronic trading even when this is less e±cient. Use of an ine±cient trading technology creates a deadweight loss and reduces consumer and producer surplus (i.e., the pro¯ts of brokerage¯rms). Pirrong (1995) demonstrates that the decline in brokerage¯rms' surplus resulting from an ine±cient technology depends on the elasticity of supply of brokerage services. If brokerage supply is very elastic (inelastic), brokers will have a small (large) stake in seeing that the e±cient technology is adopted.
well as e±ciency rami¯cations, exchange organization, ownership, and governance can also a®ect technology choice in the presence of coordination costs.
Most notably, an incumbent exchange's technology choice is a®ected by (a) the relative power of upstairs and°oor traders in exchange decision making, and (b) the ability of the exchange governance structure to support Coasean bargains between upstairs and downstairs traders (Pirrong, 2000) . Thus, ownership of the exchange (e.g., do°oor members or upstairs¯rms represent a majority?) and the nature of exchange governance a®ect technology choice.
Although owing to the competitive imperfections resulting from network e®ects and coordination costs there is no guarantee that the technology adopted is the e±cient one, it is clear that the liquidity gap cannot be- It should also be noted that other factors, not explicitly modeled, in-°u ence the relative merits of computerized and open outcry markets. In particular, the costs of market operation (including capital costs, real estate and facilities costs, labor costs, and error costs) will also exert an in°uence on technology choice. 19 The same caveat just mentioned still applies, however;
given the network and coordination aspects of¯nancial trading, the cheapest technology (including both liquidity and operational costs) may not prevail.
The analysis presented in this article suggests that it is hazardous indeed to attempt to predict (a) which trading technology will prevail and (b 
A An Alternative Model
The As the number of upstairs and°oor traders becomes arbitrarily large, Hellwig proves that the liquidity parameter converges to:
where
In these expressions, Q F (Q U ) is the measure of the set of°oor (upstairs)
traders.
20 The analysis can be extended to allow for individualized signal precisions.
In the computerized market, each trader in U and each trader in F observes a signal v + Á i , where as before E(Á 2 i ) = § Á . Here:
The expression for B C takes this form because in the computerized market 
